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Abstract
This paper analyses the interdependency between the market for
music recordings and concert tickets, assuming that there are positive
indirect network eﬀects both from the record market to ticket sales for
live performances and vice versa. Using a model with two interrelated
Salop circles we show that prices in both markets are corrected down-
wards when compared to the standard Salop model. Furthermore, we
show that the eﬀects of ﬁle sharing on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and on vari-
ety are ambiguous. File sharing can increase proﬁts through increased
concert ticket demand and thereby also lead to additional market en-
try and additional variety.
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1 Introduction
The music industry is going, once again, through a phase of rapid techno-
logical change. The digitalisation of music has made copyright enforcement
much more diﬃcult and costly, and there is a heated and very controversial
debate about the eﬀects of ﬁle sharing possibilities (see, e.g., Oberholzer-Gee
and Strumpf (2007); Liebowitz (2007)). While most of the debate focuses on
the question of how ﬁle-sharing aﬀects record sales, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and mu-
sic distribution systems (see, e.g., Alexander (2002); Peitz and Waelbroeck
(2006)), there is also a limited literature on the eﬀects of peer-to-peer net-
works on vertical product diﬀerentiation (quality) (e.g, Bayaan (2004)) and
on concert ticket sales (in particular Curien and Moreau (2005); Gayer and
Shy (2003, 2006),). Interestingly enough, there is hardly any theoretical eco-
nomic literature on the relationship between music variety and the extent
of ﬁle-sharing. To the best of our knowledge, the only notable exemption is
the paper by Curien and Moreau (2005), who analyse how ﬁle sharing aﬀects
both record and concert ticket sales in a monopoly model. They assume—as
we do—that piracy tends to boost demand for live performances and beneﬁts
artists, given the currently prevailing contracts. As sampling becomes eas-
ier, the monopolist’s proﬁts may even increase through ﬁle sharing, as may
variety in Curien and Moreau (2005). Our paper builds on this research and
explores how ﬁle-sharing, both record and concert ticket sales, and variety
are interrelated and aﬀected by the extent of ﬁle sharing in (imperfectly)
competitive markets with diﬀerentiated goods. The key diﬀerences between
Curien and Moreau (2005) and our paper are (a) that we analyse an (im-
perfectly) competitive market instead of a monopoly and (b) our model does
not only analyse eﬀects from record to ticket sales but also feedback eﬀects
from ticket to record sales.
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For this purpose our paper analyses a model with two Salop circles (Salop,
1979) where demand for a given product in the one market (e.g., the record
market) aﬀects product demand in the other market (e.g., concert tickets).
Hence, we assume that—as music consumption is also a social phenomenon,
as many individuals tend to partially deﬁne themselves through their music
consumption—the demand for concerts is increasing in record sales while the
demand for records itself is also increasing in concert ticket sales.
While our paper aims at helping to explain and understand some recent
trends in the the music industry, the model we develop is also innovative in its
own, as it is the ﬁrst paper to analyse competition in two Salop circles with
indirect network eﬀects.1 Another example which ﬁts our framework may
be the relationship between books and movies (based on these books). For
example, Harry Potter books and movies may be complements and exhibit
indirect network eﬀects. The reading of a Harry Potter book may provide a
higher utility if more people also watch the movie, while at the same time
the movie is the more attractive the more books are sold. In principle, any
complementary products that exhibit these social network eﬀects may serve
as examples.
To our knowledge the only other papers that integrate two Salop circles
are Reisinger and Schnitzer (2007) and Alexandrov et al. (2008), but they
analyse vertically related markets with an inner Salop circle of upstream
suppliers and an outer Salop circle of downstream retailers. In contrast, we
analyse two separate Salop circles with complementary products.
1Note that even though there are indirect network eﬀects present between the two
products, our model is not a two-sided market model in the sense of Armstrong (2006)
and Rochet and Tirole (2006). In two-sided markets there is typically one intermediary
who promotes transactions between diﬀerent types of consumers between which there are
indirect network eﬀects. In contrast, in our model there is a group of consumers who
demands several types of products between which indirect network eﬀects exist.
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The remainder of the paper is now organised as follows: The next section
introduces and analyses the model before section 3 extends the model to ﬁle
sharing. In section 4 we analyse the resulting welfare eﬀects, and our main
results and conclusions are summarised in section 5.
2 The Model
Let us consider the market for records (or other forms of music recording)
on the one hand and the market for music shows and performances on the
other hand. For both markets we assume that consumers are located around a
Salop circle with n diﬀerent varieties oﬀered by independent ﬁrms/bands. We
assume that there are two types of consumers. While there are N consumers
(called music lovers) that receive utility from both musical recordings and
live music shows (concerts), there are also M consumers which do not like to
attend shows, but only receive utility from recordings. The latter group will
be called listeners. A given music lover j is assumed to receive the following
utility from buying a music recording of variety i:
UR = VR − tlj + θsi − pi,
where lj denotes j’s distance from her most preferred variety of music,
while t measures the associated ”transportation” costs. The number of live
concerts of band i is denoted by si, i.e. we assume that a music lover’s utility
from a given music recording i is increased by θsi if there are also si live
concerts associated with the band’s album. In our model si corresponds to
the share of music lover that attend a concert by variety i.2 In contrast, for
2Note that the indirect network eﬀect depends only on the share of music lovers that
attend the concert by variety i. Thus, the strength of the indirect network eﬀect is
independent of the market size and the presence of music listeners. The same applies to
the indirect network eﬀect from music recordings on the concert market.
4
simple music listeners θ is assumed to be zero, i.e., they do not receive any
additional utility from live concerts. Hence, the number of live performances
is utility enhancing for music lovers and a tool of vertical product diﬀerenti-
ation for music lovers while it is not relevant for the M music listeners (i.e,
θ = 0 for music listeners, while θ > 0 for music lovers). The record price,
pi, is deducted from consumers’ utility. The gross utility from consuming
recorded music,VR, is assumed to be suﬃciently high to ensure that all music
lovers and listeners buy records. We also assume that the n varieties are
located equidistantly on the circle of circumference one with both types of
consumers being uniformly distributed around the circle (i.e., the N music
lovers are uniformly distributed around the circle, and the M music listeners
are also uniformly distributed around the circle).
Now let the music lovers’ utility from attending a live concert be given
by
UC = VC − dlj + δqi − wi,
where VC is the gross utility of attending a concert, lj denotes j’s distance
from her most preferred music variety, while d measures the associated trans-
portation costs in the live concert market. There is again a complementarity
between records and live concerts so that the utility from live concerts is en-
hanced by a factor of δ the more records are sold. Hence, there are indirect
network eﬀects from both the record market to the live concert market (the
strength of which is measured by δ) while the strength of the indirect net-
work eﬀects from the live concert market to the record market are measured
by θ. The ticket price per live concert is denoted by wi.
To ensure equilibrium existence, we have to impose a restriction on pa-
rameter values. In the Appendix, we provide the details for how we derive
this restriction:
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Assumption 1 16td(N + M) > 9N(θ + δ)2 + 36Mθδ.
Put diﬀerently, we have to assume that the degree of product diﬀerentia-
tion in the markets for records and concerts is suﬃciently large compared to
the network eﬀects between the two markets.
The indiﬀerent music lover (qm) and music listener (xm) in the music
record market and the marginal consumer in the live concert market (sm)
are given by
VR − tqm + θsi − pi = VR − t
(
1
n
− qm
)
+ θs− p,
VR − txm − pi = VR − t
(
1
n
− xm
)
− p,
VC − dsm + δqi − wi = VC − d
(
1
n
− qm
)
+ δq − w.
Hence, the respective demands are given by
qi = 2qm =
1
n
+
p− pi + θ(si − s)
t
, (1)
xi = 2xm =
1
n
+
p− pi
t
, (2)
and
si = 2sm =
1
n
+
w − wi + δ(qi − q)
d
. (3)
Taking into account the interdependencies between qi and si, we can
reformulate the two respective demand functions as
qi(pi, wi) =
1
n
+
6θ(w − wi) + 4d(p− pi)
4dt− 9θδ , (4)
and
si(pi, wi) =
1
n
+
6δ(p− pi) + 4t(w − wi)
4dt− 9θδ . (5)
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Hence, the proﬁt function that a representative ﬁrm confronts can now
be written as follows:
πi(pi, wi) = Npiqi(pi, wi) + Mpixi(pi) + Nwisi(pi, wi). (6)
Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions yields the following equilibrium prices
and quantities:
p =
t
n
− 3δ
2n
N
M + N
, (7)
w =
d
n
− 3θ
2n
(1 +
3δ
2t
M
M + N
) (8)
and, unsurprisingly, given the model set-up
si = qi =
1
n
.
Note that the resulting prices are lower than in the simple Salop model.
If we ignore the music listeners and set M = 0, so that we only focus on the
two interdependent demand functions qi and si we can rewrite the two prices
as
p =
t
n
− 3δ
2n
, (9)
and
w =
d
n
− 3θ
2n
. (10)
That means that both prices are corrected downwards when compared
to the standard Salop model. This result contrasts with other models of
two-sided markets or complementary products where usually the price for
one good or service is lower while the prices for the other product or service
increases when compared to a reference model without complementarities or
indirect network eﬀects. In our model of two interdependent Salop circles,
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this changes because, in contrast to other models, there is no market expan-
sion, but only a business stealing eﬀect. Hence, ﬁrms compete aggressively in
order to obtain customers. The more consumers’ utility of live concerts and,
therefore, their demand for them is aﬀected by record sales (as measured by
δ) the lower is the price for records and vice versa. If the indirect network
eﬀects from one market to the other are very strong, one price may even turn
negative, in principle.
Obviously, the downward correction of the record price is the lower the
fewer customers are interested in concerts. If the fraction of music lovers in
the population, as measured by N/(M +N), becomes smaller, the downward
bias of the record price, p, is also reduced. Similarly, the downward correction
of the concert ticket price, w, is the more signiﬁcant the more music listeners
there are (i.e., the higher M/(M+N)). The intuition is as follows: The more
music listeners (who are not interested in concerts) there are, the higher is
the opportunity cost (in terms of foregone revenues) of lowering the record
price (as it only stimulates demand for music concerts for a fraction of the
population). Hence, with many music listeners ﬁrms rather keep record prices
up and stimulate record sales to music lovers by ”cross-subsidising” ticket
prices.
Inserting equilibrium prices into the proﬁt function, we obtain equilibrium
proﬁts of each record company:
Π∗ =
(N + M)
n
[
t
n
− 3δ
2n
N
(M + N)
]
+
N
n
[
d
n
− 3θ
2n
(
1 +
3δ
2t
M
M + N
)]
.
(11)
The network eﬀects have a negative impact on proﬁtability. The higher
δ and θ, the lower is the ﬁrms’ proﬁt. The reason is the aforementioned
downward pressure on prices for records and concerts due to the interrelated
demands for the two products. Concerning the degree of product diﬀeren-
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tiation, measured by d and t, the model delivers the standard predictions.
The higher the transportation costs, the higher are ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The re-
lationship between proﬁts and the number of competitors in the market is
also standard. It can be shown that, given our assumption, equation (11)
decreases in n.
In a next step, we proceed by analysing the musical diversity provided
by the market. As we assume that each ﬁrm represent a single artist, this
corresponds to endogenising the number of ﬁrms. Suppose there is a ﬁxed
cost of f per ﬁrm, then the number of entrants is determined by solving
Π∗ = f for n. More explicitly, the number of diﬀerent artists in the market
(musical diversity) is given by:
n =
√
(N + M)
f
[
t− 3δ
2
N
(M + N)
]
+
N
f
[
d− 3θ
2
(1 +
3δ
2t
M
M + N
)
]
. (12)
Comparative statics concerning diversity correspond with the ones con-
cerning proﬁts. A larger degree of product diﬀerentiation increases diversity,
and stronger complementarity eﬀects reduce diversity.
3 File Sharing
Let us now analyse how ﬁle-sharing aﬀects the equilibrium. For this purpose
we assume that only a fraction α of the customer masses of N and M is
actually paying for recorded music while the fraction (1− α) is engaging in
piracy or ﬁle sharing. The representative ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximisation problem
now becomes
πi(pi, wi) = αNpiqi(pi, wi) + αMpixi(pi) + Nwisi(pi, wi).
Our restriction on parameter values to guarantee equilibrium existence
modiﬁes as follows:
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Assumption 2 16td(N + M)α > 9N(αθ + δ)2 + 36αMθδ.
Deriving the ﬁrst-order conditions and solving for symmetric equilibria
yields the following equilibrium values
p =
t
n
− 3δ
2n
N
α(M + N)
,
and
w =
d
n
− 3θ
2n
(α +
3δ
2t
M
M + N
).
File-sharing has opposite eﬀects on the prices for records and concerts.
It decreases the price for records, but increases the price for live concerts.
Note that this eﬀect of ﬁle-sharing relies on the presence of complementarities
between the two markets.
To understand our results, suppose ﬁrst that there are no complementar-
ities, that is, δ = θ = 0. Then equilibrium prices would not be aﬀected by
ﬁle-sharing. File-sharing would only aﬀect ﬁrms by reduced proﬁtability in
the market for records as only a proportion α of consumers would actually
pay for records. The market for live concerts would not be aﬀected at all.
Next suppose that δ > 0, but still θ = 0. That is there is only a positive com-
plementarity from record sales on the utility from concerts. Then increased
ﬁle-sharing reduces the equilibrium price for records and leaves the price for
concerts unchanged. The intuition goes as follows: As shown above, a posi-
tive δ induces ﬁrms to lower their price in the market for records to attract
additional customers in the market for live music. An increase in ﬁle-sharing
decreases the opportunity costs of lowering the price for records as only a
fraction α pays for record. And hence, in equilibrium the price for records
is reduced. Now suppose there is additionally a positive complementarity
from concert visits onto record sales. Due to the complementarity prices for
concerts are lower than in a standard Salop model. However, this downward
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correction depends on the degree of ﬁle-sharing. The more ﬁle-sharing the
lower the incentives to reduce the price for concerts to attract sales in the
record market as the beneﬁt in the record market are reduced with more
ﬁle-sharing.
Inserting equilibrium prices into proﬁts gives
Π∗ =
α(N + M)
n
[
t
n
− 3δ
2n
N
α(M + N)
]
+
N
n
[
d
n
− 3θ
2n
(α +
3δ
2t
M
M + N
)
]
.
(13)
Comparative statics concerning the degree of product diﬀerentiation and
the size of the network eﬀects yield the same results as without ﬁle-sharing.
More interesting is the impact of ﬁle-sharing on proﬁtability. Diﬀerentiating
proﬁts with respect to α yields
∂Π
∂α
=
2t(N + M)− 3Nθ
2n2
. (14)
This expression can be positive or negative. It is positive if t
θ
> 3
2
N
N+M
and negative if the converse holds. Hence, ﬁle sharing can have a positive
impact on proﬁts if the interdependency from concerts on record sales is
suﬃciently high. As seen above increased ﬁle-sharing has a positive eﬀect on
concert prices but a negative eﬀect on record prices. Thus, the overall eﬀect
depends on the size of these two eﬀects. If t is high, revenues from record
sales make a large proportion of proﬁts. Then, ﬁle-sharing, that is a lower
value of α, has a detrimental eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts. However, if t is relatively
low, income from record sales is relatively unimportant and ﬁle-sharing has
a positive impact on proﬁts.
The economic literature has shown several avenues by which ﬁle-sharing
may increase proﬁts: Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) show that due to sampling
eﬀects record companies may gain from downloading. In Gayer and Shy
(2006) diﬀerent players in the music industry are aﬀected diﬀerently by ﬁle-
sharing. While record companies lose from ﬁle-sharing, artists may gain due
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to cross-eﬀects onto the market for concerts and other merchandising. We
add to these results by providing a further way. If network eﬀects from
concert attendance on record sales are signiﬁcant, then ﬁle-sharing can be
positive for record company proﬁts because ﬁrms compete and price less
aggressively in the concert ticket market, as stimulating record sales is less
rewarding.
Endogenising diversity in the music market, we get:
n =
√
α(N + M)
f
[
t− 3δ
2
N
α(M + N)
]
+
N
f
[
d− 3θ
2
(α +
3δ
2t
M
M + N
)
]
.
(15)
We are interested in the impact of ﬁle-sharing on musical diversity. More
ﬁle-sharing (lower α) can increase or decrease diversity as measured by n.
This follows immediately from the impact of ﬁle-sharing on proﬁts as shown
above. If ﬁle-sharing increases proﬁts it increases the incentives to enter, and
hence diversity rises.
4 Welfare
Finally, we are interested in the welfare properties of our equilibrium and, in
particular, in the welfare eﬀects of ﬁle-sharing.
There are three factors that impact on total welfare: i) transportation
costs in the record and in the concert market, ii) ﬁxed costs of establishing a
ﬁrm, and iii) the indirect network eﬀects between the record and the concert
market:
W = −2n(N + M)
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx− 2nN
∫ 1
2n
0
dx dx− nf + Nnθ + δ
n
(16)
= −2n(N + M)
∫ 1
2n
0
tx dx− 2nN
∫ 1
2n
0
dx dx− nf + N(θ + δ)
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Note, however, that the indirect network eﬀects are independent of the
number of artists in the market. Thus, as in the standard Salop model welfare
is maximised when the marginal reduction in transportation costs equals the
additional ﬁxed cost of further ﬁrm entry. This welfare optimal number of
ﬁrms is given by:
nw =
√
(N + M)t + Nd
4f
. (17)
4.1 No File-Sharing
While in the standard model excess entry prevails, i.e., the number of entrants
exceeds their welfare optimal number, this does not need to be the case in
a model with network eﬀects. As demonstrated above, prices are corrected
downwards in comparison to the standard Salop model which translates in
lower proﬁts and, hence, a lower number of entrants.
A comparison between the eﬃcient and the competitive number of ﬁrms
yields that there is excessive entry if
3(N + M)t + 3Nd > 6N(δ + θ) +
9δθNM
t(N + M)
. (18)
Otherwise, there is insuﬃcient entry. Both outcomes are compatible with
our assumption concerning parameter values. The condition above reveals
that excess entry is more likely to prevail if transportation costs are high and
network eﬀects small.
4.2 File-Sharing
In a situation with ﬁle sharing there is excessive entry if
(N + M)(4α− 1)t + 3Nd > 6N(δ + αθ) + 9δθNM
t(N + M)
, (19)
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while there there is insuﬃcient entry otherwise. Again both outcomes are
compatible with our assumptions concerning parameter values. Unfortu-
nately, the question whether ﬁle-sharing is welfare enhancing or not, cannot
be unambiguously answered. The welfare results of ﬁle sharing are mixed, as
virtually anything is possible. As shown above, an increase in ﬁle-sharing can
either increase or decrease variety. Thus, in situations of excess entry, more
ﬁle-sharing is beneﬁcial for welfare if it reduces variety, but it is detrimental
to welfare if it increases variety. Unfortunately, either is possible, depending
on parameter values. In contrast, in situations of insuﬃcient entry, increased
copying is welfare enhancing if it increases variety while it is welfare reducing
if it reduces variety. Again, either is possible. In summary, the impact of
ﬁle-sharing on welfare is therefore ambiguous and the welfare eﬀects depend
on the exact situation (i.e., parameter values).
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analysed the interdependency between the market for music
recordings and concert tickets, assuming that there are positive indirect net-
work eﬀects both from the record market to ticket sales for live performances
and vice versa. Using a model with two interrelated Salop circles we have
shown that prices in both markets are corrected downwards when compared
to the standard Salop model. Furthermore, we have shown that the eﬀects of
ﬁle sharing on ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and on variety are ambiguous. File sharing
can increase proﬁts through increased concert ticket demand and thereby
also lead to additional market entry and additional variety.
Similarly, ﬁle-sharing may potentially increase welfare if it induces addi-
tional market entry in cases of an ineﬃciently small variety or if it reduces
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and, thereby, market entry if variety is ineﬃciently large.
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Appendix
For our equilibrium to exist the second order conditions must hold. We
consider the more general case with ﬁle-sharing. The case without ﬁle-sharing
can be reproduced by setting α = 1. The Hessian of our optimisation problem
is
H =
(
− 8Ndα
4td−9θδ − 2Mαt −6N(αθ+δ)4td−9θδ
−6N(αθ+δ)
4td−9θδ − 8Nt4td−9θδ
)
. (20)
For the second-order conditions to be fulﬁlled the Hessian needs to be
negative semi-deﬁnite. That is the ﬁrst leading principle minor needs to be
negative and the determinant needs to be positive. This is ensured if two
conditions are met:
4td > 9θδ, (21)
and
16td(N + M)α > 9N(αθ + δ)2 + 36αMθδ. (22)
It can then be shown that the second condition is more restrictive. Re-
formulating, the ﬁrst condition can be expressed as 16td(N +M)α > 36(N +
M)θδα. Then, 9N(αθ+δ)2+36αMθδ > 36(N+M)θδα, and hence the second
condition is more restrictive. Thus, to satisfy the second-order conditions it
is suﬃcient to assume:
16td(N + M)α > 9N(αθ + δ)2 + 36αMθδ. (23)
.
In case there is no ﬁle-sharing the condition simpliﬁes to:
16td(N + M) > 9N(θ + δ)2 + 36Mθδ. (24)
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